Liberals conceive of territorial rights as dependent on the legitimacy of the state, which is in turn understood in terms of the state's protection of individual rights and freedoms. Such justifications of territorial rights have difficulties in addressing the right to control immigration, which is therefore in need of additional justification. The paper considers Christopher Heath Wellman's liberal proposal for justifying the right to control immigration, which understands the right as derivative of a general right to freedom of association held collectively by the people of the state.
Introduction
This paper is about the relationship between the territorial rights of states and their right to control and limit immigration into their territories. I focus on a broadly liberal conception of territorial rights as dependent on the legitimacy of the state, which is in turn understood in terms of the state's protection of individual rights and freedoms. Such justifications of territorial rights are quite attractive, but have difficulties in addressing precisely the right to control immigration, which is therefore in need of additional justification. I will consider a specific proposal for how the right to control immigration can be justified without relying on ideas such as natural property rights or the self-determination of pre-political nations. The proposal understands the right to control immigration as derivative of a general right to freedom of association held collectively by the people of the state. Protection of individual rights and freedom of association are both core liberal values. Together they promise to provide a coherent justification of territorial states and the right such states are ordinarily thought to have to control immigration. If this justification works, liberals can rebut allegations that they are not able to address questions about borders and exclusion without either succumbing to radical cosmopolitanism or become parasitic on realist or nationalist assumptions. 1 Although theoretically and normatively attractive, the liberal conception of territorial rights faces difficulties in the case of immigration. My claim is that state legitimacy and freedom of political association fail to connect in the way required to justify a right to control immigration. I will try to show this with regard to the particular version of the liberal conception presented by Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman in their liberal theory of international justice, 3 which is the most comprehensive articulation of this broad kind of view. My diagnosis of the problems facing the liberal conception in general, and Altman and Wellman's position in particular, is that it runs together the state as an institution and the people as a political collective and elides the difference between territorial jurisdiction and associational freedom.
While these conflations make things easier for liberals than they really are, my purpose is not to argue against either liberalism or any kind of immigration control. In fact, one of the points of my discussion is to highlight that Altman and Wellman's theory exemplifies how the discussion of immigration needs to address both territorial rights and other normative issues not directly related to territory; both are necessary for any plausible justification of a right to control immigration, and each is insufficient on its own. So my positive claim is that the structure of their justification is correct; my negative claim merely is that their particular proposal for how the liberal legitimacy theory of territorial rights should be complemented by considerations of freedom of association fails. In the course of showing this I make a number of theoretical distinctions relevant to theories of territorial rights more generally, which might be helpful for alternative attempts to formulate justification applicable to immigration.
Territorial Rights
The territorial rights of states are the rights states have regarding their territory.
2 This can be analyzed as saying that the state is the subject of a right, the object of which involves reference to 2 While I limit my discussion to the territorial rights of states, I do not for present purposes take a stand on whether states are the only entities that can have territorial rights or whether non-state entities, e.g. national groups or the peoples of conquered states, might also have. The limitation is due to the fact that I am addressing liberal theories attempting to justify territorial rights of states without invoking pre-political territorial rights, such as both nationalist and traditional libertarian theories do. A separate reason for doubting whether non-state entities can have territorial 4 the territory. That the state has a right means that other agents are placed under duties or rendered morally disabled or liable in certain ways towards the state regarding the object of the right. There can then be different kinds of territorial rights depending on what claims or powers the state has and how these involve the territory. One, now standard, typology of territorial rights distinguishes between property rights, jurisdictional rights, and meta-jurisdictional rights. Property rights are rights of ownership over things. Jurisdictional rights are rights to make, adjudicate, and enforce rules, both for how property rights should be regulated as well as other kinds of regulations, e.g.
criminal law or traffic regulations. And meta-jurisdictional rights are rights to determine and change jurisdictions. 3 States may have property rights over parts of their territory, but most of the territorial rights of states are not property rights. The main sense of territorial rights of states is jurisdictional.
This captures a central aspect of a widely accepted Weberian understanding of states as institutions
claiming a monopoly to the legitimate exercise of violence within a territory, i.e. the idea that a state not only regulates relations within a territory in a way backed by coercion, but also claims to be the only agency which can do this legitimately. To be a state then centrally involves claiming jurisdiction over a territory. understood is whether they enjoy the bundle of rights traditionally referred to as sovereignty.
Sovereignty rights can, according to Altman and Wellman, be understood as tied together by an abstract right of the state to self-determination. Both sovereignty and self-determination involve territorial aspects since they concern the rights of the state to exist and to make, adjudicate, and enforce law within the territory. The central question, then, is when a state has the right to selfdetermination. Altman and Wellman propose the simple liberal answer that:
Legitimacy rests on the ability and willingness of a state to adequately protect the human rights of its constituents and to respect the rights of all others. If a state adequately protects and respects human rights … it successfully carries out the "requisite political functions." That is, the state is doing the job that it needs to do in order to justify its coercive power and thereby be legitimate.
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So if a state performs the 'requisite political functions' in terms of human rights protection, then it is legitimate. Altman and Wellman then add that:
only a legitimate state has a moral right of self-determination. Moreover, we hold that this right is irreducible to the individual rights of the constituents of the state. The right is a group right: it belongs to the members of the state as a collective body, because it can only be exercised jointly by its members.
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These are substantial normative claims, since Altman and Wellman understand the status of legitimacy and the accompanying collective right of self-determination not only as Hohfeldian liberty rights to rule, but also as Hohfeldian claim rights that 'other agents have a duty to respect the decisions made in the exercise of that power,' 19 which binds both members subjected to the internal authority of the state and foreign persons and powers.
Immigration and Territorial Rights
Even if one accepts a general liberal legitimacy theory of territorial rights according to which adequate protection of and respect for human rights renders a state legitimate, which gives the state the territorial right to make, adjudicate, and enforce law within its territory, it is still problematic to extend this territorial right to a right to control immigration:
The problem is that the two rights are conceptually different in a way which arguably also Returning to the conceptual and normative distinctness of territorial rights and a right to control immigration, Altman and Wellman are apparently well aware of the need to provide a separate justification for the right to control immigration. Their proposal is that the right to control immigration is a corollary of a more general right to freedom of association, which all legitimate states enjoy in virtue of their right to self-determination. Wellman has elsewhere formulated their argument simply as follows:
This type of argument involves three basic premises (1) legitimate states have a right to political self-determination, (2) freedom of association is an essential component of 14 self-determination, and (3) freedom of association entitles one to refuse to associate with others.
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The conclusion is that 'a legitimate state's right to freedom of association entitles it to choose whether or not to admit any given immigrants.' The question then is 1) why one should accept the three premises, and 2) whether the conclusion that legitimate states have a right to control immigration follows from these premises?
The first premise is a basic building block of Altman and Wellman's liberal theory. It is not specific to the issue of immigration but general; it both explains the value of democratic governance, the existence of a primary right to secession for groups able and willing to constitute legitimate states, and is crucial to whether military interventions are permissible. It is also expressed in their liberal legitimacy theory of territorial rights. Since the present paper is an internal critique of their argument regarding immigration, I will simply accept the first premise in the form needed to justify these other elements of Altman and Wellman's theory for the purpose of my argument.
The second and third premises are supported through what might be called a 'reflective equilibrium' argument, namely that they are necessary to answer the so-called particularity problem. The particularity problem is that even if adequate protection of and respect for human rights justifies political authority over a territory, this justification does not in itself explain why a particular state should have this authority rather than another state that could fulfill 
Legitimacy as a Ground for Self-Determination
A central part of Altman and Wellman's rationale for why states have a right to freedom of association is that legitimacy grounds a right to self-determination. What does this mean and is it plausible? In relation to states, self-determination traditionally means that other states are bound by duties of non-intervention. If a state is indeed legitimate, then this seems plausible, since intervention would minimally require justification in terms of a need to protect human rights.
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But Altman and Wellman take self-determination to mean more than a right to nonintervention. Self-determination only implies the right to freedom of association needed to justify a right to control immigration if it also includes the right to determine what the "self" in question is:
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Because the members of a group can change, an important part of group selfdetermination is having control over what the "self" is. In other words, unlike individual self-determination, a significant component of group self-determination is having control over the group which in turn gets to be self-determining.
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So self-determination is not a purely external matter, but also an internal matter, and not only a right of the state vis-a-vis other states, but a right over its own people as well. Rights over the people are well-known from the doctrine of popular sovereignty, according to which the people have a right to rule over themselves (this right is reflective in the sense that its subject and object are identical).
Altman and Wellman also subscribe to a version of this view, since their central principle is that any group able and willing to constitute a legitimate state has a collective right to self-determination, which among other things explains the intrinsic value of democratic rule. 35 Only legitimate states can appeal to such a right, since a main reason for denying a right to rule is that the rule fails to represent the people. The connection between legitimacy as protection of individual human rights and the collective right to self-rule is weaker than that between legitimacy and the right to non- 
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But Altman and Wellman's understanding of self-determination takes a radical step beyond self-rule: as expressed in the above quote, it not only concerns a people's right to rule over themselves but the people's right to determine the composition of its 'self.' There are three things to say about this: First, this is a completely different sense of self-determination than non-intervention and collective self-rule; the objects of and rights incidents involved in the three rights to selfdetermination are different. Non-intervention is a negative claim right obliging other states not to interfere. Self-rule is a liberty, positive claim right and power to make, adjudicate, and enforce law within a territorial jurisdiction, which obliges individuals within the jurisdiction to obey the law, and makes the collective immune from competing authorities. Self-composition is apparently a liberty, positive claim right, and power to determine who are members of the people, which apparently, although this is unclear from Altman and Wellman's formulation, not only can grant them the status of membership but also oblige individuals in this respect. The question is whether there is reason to accept such a new sense of self-determination.
Recall that Altman and Wellman support their principle of collective selfdetermination by its capacity to explain why unilateral annexation is wrong. This is a strong intuition, but the sense of self-determination as self-composition is not necessary to explain this.
Self-determination as non-intervention will amply do the trick. The right to self-determination is also supported by its role in explaining the value of democracy, but what is required for this purpose is only self-determination as self-rule, not as self-composition. Altman and Wellman do, of course,
give other examples to support the claim that a right to freedom of association is an important part of self-determination for both individuals and groups, e.g. in cases of marriage and golf club membership. 37 But the question, especially in light of Miller's criticism noted above, precisely is whether the uncontroversial value of freedom of association at the individual and civil associational levels extends to states. This is what has to be shown, and this is why Altman and Wellman need the annexation case. My point is that at the state level, the independent intuitive support for a collective right of self-determination supports only non-intervention and self-rule, not selfcomposition; one is not given any reason at all to accept self-determination as self-composition even if one accepts all the intuitions about annexation, the value of democracy, etc. which Altman and Wellman invoke to support it. What they are doing here is actually introducing a completely new notion of self-determination rather than just articulating the already existing implications of an already established notion. And this new principle of self-determination as self-composition is not supported at all through the reflective equilibrium arguments at the state level.
There might of course still be other reasons to accept a collective right to selfdetermination as self-composition. My second point is that this new principle is much less intuitive than the other senses of self-determination and that we therefore do not have any good reason to China's one-child rule, which some already consider problematic. But a general collective right to control the composition of the collective 'self' -a right which Altman and Wellman acknowledge takes precedence over individual rights 38 -would also justify policies like those adopted by the Third Reich, including bans on racially mixed offspring, coercive abortions of unwanted children, sterilizations of unwanted parents, state regulated breeding programs, etc.
Since the right to self-determination as self-composition is independent of the selfdetermination as non-intervention and self-rule, and therefore a separate principle, the plausibility of self-composition has to be assessed on its own and on the basis of the implications of such a right. As shown above, some of the implications are radically counterintuitive because a general right to collective self-composition would seem to justify unacceptable forms of population control.
Altman and Wellman might reply, however, that the counterintuitive implications can be avoided by constraining the right properly. They take the right to self-determination to be conditional: only legitimate states that respect human rights have the right in the first place. So if state interference in the reproductive choices of citizens is a human rights violation, 39 Altman and Wellman can avoid this implication.
But then the third thing to note concerning Altman and Wellman's notion of selfdetermination as self-composition is that the supportive relationship between legitimacy and selfdetermination in this sense is missing. Where legitimacy naturally and plausibly grounds a right to non-intervention, it is elusive why the fact that a state protects and respects human rights should
give the people of the state the right to control its own composition. There is no material connection between legitimacy and composition that makes such a link plausible. This was also the case for self-determination as self-rule, but in the case of self-determination as self-composition the problem 
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is worse: the fact that a right to control composition violates human rights unless constrained shows that not only is such a right not derivable from a concern with human rights; it directly contradicts human rights. So my objection here is that Altman and Wellman's rationale for the right to freedom of association in terms of its connection through self-determination to legitimacy is implausible.
It might be objected that even though not all means of population control are legitimate, the aim of limiting the population surely is legitimate under certain conditions, e.g. the threat of over-population, and that this supports a collective right to self-composition. I have two answers to this objection: First, many legitimate forms of population policy do not require a right to self-composition, which as I noted above involves claim rights against members of the people, since they can often be effectively pursued by states in ways not involving the imposition of duties on members of the population to have or not have children -economic incentives might for instance be effective without violating human rights. Secondly, even if it is justified in special cases to require people not to reproduce, e.g. because of catastrophic consequences of unregulated reproduction, this is not equivalent to there being a general collective right to self-composition. Such a right would
give the state a pro tanto right to impose duties on people regarding reproduction in all cases. That it is justified to impose such duties in special cases neither shows that there is a pro tanto right to do so in other cases, nor is such a general right necessary to justify the special cases, since they might be justified on other, e.g. consequentialist, grounds.
To summarize: The notion of self-determination as a general right to self-composition needed in Altman and Wellman's argument for a right to control immigration is different from selfdetermination as non-intervention and as self-rule. Therefore it is not supported by the reflective equilibrium arguments justifying the other rights. And considered as an independent principle, it is counterintuitive and unnecessary. Even as constrained by human rights, there is therefore no reason to accept this independent principle.
States have Territorial Rights, Peoples have Freedom of Association
The second part of my criticism can be presented on the basis of another problem noted by Fine.
She points out that the argument for a right to control immigration based on freedom of association presupposes territorial rights: 'the citizens of a state are not entitled to stop noncitizens from settling there, despite their claim to control access to membership, without a further entitlement to control access to the territory in the first place.' 40 This is of course entirely true. But when viewed in the context of Altman and Wellman's broader theory as presented above, they have an answer to this objection which apparently retains a coherent unity in their position, since their theory incorporates a liberal legitimacy theory of territorial rights. If it is true that legitimacy both grounds territorial rights and the right to freedom of association of states, then Fine's objection is answered.
My second objection now is that, irrespective of my first objection to selfdetermination as self-composition, it still does not follow from the fact that the state has 1) territorial rights, and 2) a right to freedom of association, that 3) it has a right to control 
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As long as a state adequately protects and respects human rights, it possesses such a right of self-determination. Moreover, we contend that this right of self-determination is irreducibly collective and so held by the group of persons who constitute the state.
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Here it seems that the state and the people are simply considered as one and the same. 43 But this is hardly a correct characterization. The state is an institution (a set of rules defining roles with specific rights) with a specific mode of functioning (promulgation of laws within a territorially defined jurisdiction backed by a claim for a monopoly on legitimate violence). As such the state is distinct both from the persons who staff it (officials) and direct it (judges, members of parliament, and government) as well as those who are regularly subjected to it and provide its legitimation (citizens).
If the state and the people are distinct entities, which one is the holder of the rights in question? Altman and Wellman elsewhere remark that:
This right of self-determination ... inheres not in governmental institutions, much less in the officials who occupy these institutions. Rather, it inheres in a political society as a whole. Institutions are the means through which protection of human rights is provided and made secure by society.
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So 'people' in my usage is a strictly politically delineated collective. This usage is reminiscent of that in Stilz, 'Nations, States, and Territory,' p. 591, although I do not here go into the possible 'morally salient bonds' uniting a people. 
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This seems plausible, but it is too imprecise. One reason is that 'political society' is completely vague. Another reason is that the general right to self-determination is not the right directly implicated in the argument for a right to control immigration; rather, the relevant rights are the territorial rights and the right to freedom of association. The question is who the holders of these specific derivate or component rights are?
It seems that the right to freedom of association must be held by the people, at least insofar as the association in question is with other persons (citizens or immigrants), as opposed to other states, for only people can associate. The association in question is that of becoming a member of a group of persons, and only persons and groups of persons can do this; institutions cannot. To take an analogous example: even if the people affiliated to an institution such as a university have freedom of association to form clubs and fraternities, it would not make sense to say that it is the university as such that is the holder of the right to associate, because the university cannot be a member of a university club or fraternity. So even if staffs and students of the university only have the right to freely form associations within the university because they are affiliated to the institution, it is the members of the group of affiliates who have this right, not the institution.
On the other hand, if the territorial rights are jurisdictional rights to make, adjudicate, assigned to entities that are not individual persons. This is not controversial. Think for instance of the rights of contract of corporations: even though a private company is an artificial entity, we are perfectly used to ascribing such entities legal rights, and at least some of these rights arguably reflect moral rights, which, although the entity itself is not a subject of intrinsic moral respect and concern, are moral rights because they can be justified as a way of protecting and respecting individuals, e.g. the stakeholders of the corporation. But even though the moral justification for the rights must refer to the interests of individual persons, this does not mean that the individual stakeholders of a corporation are the holders of the rights of the corporation. Only the corporation 28 as an institutional entity can exercise these rights. And analogously: only the state can exercise the jurisdictional rights the performance of which not only provides the justification for having the state, but for which, according to the liberal statist argument, the state is necessary.
So we have three distinctions: 1) contrary to what Altman and Wellman's somewhat casual formulations suggest, the state and the people are not identical; 2) jurisdictional rights are territorial whereas the right to freedom of association is not, and 3) territorial rights are held by the state whereas the right to freedom of association is held by the people. Consider now again Altman and Wellman's argument for a right to control immigration supplemented so as to answer Fine's objection:
(1) Legitimate states have a right to political self-determination (5) on the basis of (1-4); it does not follow from the premise that the people have a right to freedom of association, that the state has a right to control immigration, even if the state also enjoys territorial rights. There is a justification for excluding immigrants, to be sure, which refers to the freedom of association that I here for the sake of argument assume the people have. But this right is only a right of the people not to associate and at most grounds a duty on others not to impose themselves on the association. But it does not follow from this that the state has a right to exclude unwanted immigrants from the territory, for two reasons: first, the people holding the right to freedom of association cannot perform the territorial exclusion, and secondly, freedom of association only justifies associational exclusion. The state, on the other hand, could perform the territorial exclusion, but it is not justified in doing so, since it only holds territorial rights which do not imply a right to exclude immigrants. Because the duties of non-interference corresponding to the right of self-determination are duties towards legitimate states, it is legitimate states that are the holders of rights of self-determination.
To see my point in a different way, recall that Altman and Wellman presented freedom of association as justified because it provides an answer to the particularity problem. The problem, dramatized by the annexation objection, was that even if a state adequately protects human rights, this is not in itself a reason why this state rather than another should hold territorial rights over a specific area. Freedom of association works as an answer to the annexation objection because a state annexing another is forcing the citizens of the annexed state into an association with its own citizens, which violates their right to freedom of association. The problem is that immigration is crucially different from annexation. Immigration is a matter of individuals taking up residence within the territory of a state, whereas annexation is a matter of one state taking over another, subjecting its people to its own authority and including the latter's territory in its jurisdiction. There are several dis-analogies: 1) Immigration is an individual phenomenon, whereas annexation is collective and institutional; 2) annexation involves a change in jurisdiction (it is a unilateral exercise of meta-jurisdictive power), whereas immigration does not (it involves acceptance of the jurisdiction of the receiving state), and 3) annexation is a breach of freedom of association because the people of the annexed state are forcibly incorporated into the people of the annexing state, whereas immigration in itself only involves granting residence permission. These dis-analogies need not invoke such strong cosmopolitan premises in order to deflect the argument; the fact that there is no reason to accept one of the premises is sufficient.
Conclusion
At the normative level the paper has been primarily a negative argument pointing out what I take to be some failures in a specific argumentative strategy for justifying a right to exclude immigrants on the basis of the territorial rights of states. Even though I have presented this argument as a criticism of Altman and Wellman's theory, I believe that it is of wider relevance, and it is furthermore not intended as a rejection of their general liberal position on legitimacy and territorial rights. At a more general theoretical level, the paper is not only negative and critical. One general lesson of my discussion is that Altman and Wellman's liberal theory in fact has the right structure to address the problem. Immigration is by its very nature a territorial issue, so an account of territorial rights is necessary to mount any justification for a right to control immigration. But the right to exclude immigrants does not in itself follow from a right to territorial jurisdiction. I have shown that Altman and Wellman implicitly acknowledge both of these points. My point has been to make it explicit that an account of territorial rights of jurisdiction is necessary but not sufficient for a justification of a right to exclude immigrants. I have then further argued that Altman and Wellman's substantial proposal for the additional justification fails. In doing this I have analyzed and elucidated some of the central concepts used when discussing these issues. There is much complexity here which is both normatively relevant and often glossed over in debates about specific normative issues. I hope 51 Lea Ypi, 'A Permissive Theory of Territorial Rights,' forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy.
